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Implementing the 1993 Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement
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Abstract: Following more than 20 years of research and negotiation, the Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) was ratified by Inuit and the Government of 
Canada in 1993. The territory of Nunavut and the Government of Nunavut were 
established in 1999 pursuant to the Agreement. In exchange for a wide range 
of constitutionally protected rights and benefits, the Inuit of Nunavut ceded to 
the Crown «all their aboriginal claims, rights, titles and interests … to lands 
and waters anywhere within Canada …» While much has been accomplished 
through the Agreement, huge implementation challenges remain. Successful 
implementation of the Agreement requires a firm and enduring partnership 
between the Inuit of Nunavut and the governments of Canada and Nunavut. 
To ensure that this partnership is effective and to safeguard the «honour of the 
Crown,» the Government of Canada should adopt policies and inter-agency and 
inter-governmental processes to ensure the Agreement is fully implemented.
Keywords: Inuit, Nunavut Agreement, Implementation, Government of Canada, 
Litigation.
1. Introduction
The 282-page Nunavut Land Claims Agreement1 – a modern treaty that applies 
to more than 20 percent of Canada – was approved in November 1992 by Inuit 
through a Nunavut-wide vote, and in 1993 through legislation passed by the 
1. Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty in Right of 
Canada, The Tungavik and the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa 
1993.
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Parliament of Canada. Pursuant to Article Four of the Agreement, the territory of 
Nunavut and the Government of Nunavut were established in 1999. Under Section 
35 of Canada’s 1982 Constitution Act, promises in modern treaties confer justicia-
ble rights protected by the constitution from unilateral action by the Parliament 
or Government of Canada, and territorial and provincial governments.2
Ratification of the Nunavut Agreement attracted favourable if momentary com-
ment in newspapers in Canada and elsewhere. Prime Minister Mulroney charac-
terized the Agreement as «nation building.»3 Writing from the perspective of a 
negotiator with the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN), the Inuit organiza-
tion that represented the Inuit of Nunavut, Fenge4 identified several reasons to 
explain the conclusion of the Agreement, and Légaré5 addressed the process of 
negotiation. Selection of Inuit owned lands – Inuit now own outright approxi-
mately 356,000 square kilometres, 15 percent of Nunavut – has been addressed 
by McPherson, who advised TFN on subsurface land selections.6 Negotiation of 
the parks and conservation provisions of the Agreement has been examined by 
Fenge.7
Commentary and analyses by academics has focused on the 1993 to 1999 pro-
cess to plan the establishment of the Government of Nunavut, and initiatives to 
promote gender equality in the territorial legislature, to devolve government opera-
tions to the regions, and to bring Inuit values and objectives, and use of Inuktitut, 
to the heart of decision-making through application of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, 
broadly understood as «Inuit traditional knowledge.»8 Implementation of the po-
litical development provisions of the Agreement has attracted considerable atten-
2. For a good introduction to the creation of Nunavut, see the articles in Dahl, Jens; Hicks, 
Jack; and Jull, Peter, (eds.) Nunavut: Inuit Regain Control of their Lands and their Lives, 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen, Denmark 2000.
3. Prime Minister Mulroney’s 25 May 1993 speech is reprinted in «Creating Nunavut and 
Breaking the Mold of the Past» in Northern Perspectives, (21) 3, 1993 p. 4.
4. Fenge, Terry, «Political development and environmental management in Northern Canada: 
The case of the Nunavut Agreement» in Inuit Studies, (16) 1–2, 1992 pp. 115–141.
5. Légaré, André, «The process leading to a Land Claims Agreement and its Implementation: 
The Case of the Nunavut Land Claims Settlement» in Canadian Journal of Native Studies,(16) 
1, 1996 pp. 139–163.
6. McPherson, Robert, New Owners in their Own Land: Minerals and Inuit Land Claims, Arctic 
Institute of North America, Calgary 2003.
7. Fenge, Terry, «National Parks in the Canadian Arctic: The Case of the Nunavut Land Claim 
Agreement» in Environments, (22) 1, 1993 pp. 21–36.
8. See for example, Timpson, Annis May, «Rethinking the Administration of Government: Inuit 
Representation, Culture, and Language in the Nunavut Public Service,» in First Nations, First 
Thoughts, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver 2009.
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tion as exemplified by the work of White,9 Légaré,10 and Loukacheva.11 Yet while 
of central importance to the Nunavut project as conceived by Inuit leaders in the 
1970s,12 at a scant three paragraphs Article Four is the shortest of the Agreement’s 
42 Articles. John Ralston Saul, a Canadian philosopher, suggests that the estab-
lishment of Nunavut, and by this he means the Government of Nunavut, «prop-
erly recognized» the role and place of Inuit in Canada, and by implication helps 
to bring to a close what can only be described as a colonial relationship between 
Canada and Inuit.13 Dewar, however, contends that there is a continued unresolved 
relationship between implementation of Article Four and the broader intent of the 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement,14 while Cameron and Campbell look forward 
to further political and economic development in Nunavut through devolution to 
the Government of Nunavut of remaining federal responsibilities in the territory.15
Those articles of the Agreement that address economic, social and cultural 
development and management of land and natural resources have not attracted 
the same level of interest or commentary as political development,16 and neither 
have ongoing challenges to implement the Agreement as a whole. This article seeks 
to redress this imbalance by outlining processes involving Nunavut Tunngavik 
Incorporated (NTI), the successor organization to TFN, and the Government of 
Canada to implement the Agreement. It is the hope of the authors that discus-
9. White, Graham, «Nunavut: Challenges and Opportunities of Creating a New Government» 
in Public Sector Management, (9) 3, 1999 pp. 3–7.
10. Légaré, André, «An Assessment of Recent Political Development in Nunavut: the Challenges 
and Dilemmas of Inuit Self-Government» in Canadian Journal of Native Studies, (18) 2, 1998 
pp. 271–299; and «Canada’s Aboriginal Self-Determination in Nunavut: From Vision to 
Illusion» in International Journal of Minority and Group Rights, (15) 2008 pp. 335–367.
11. Loukacheva, Natalia, The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and 
Nunavut, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2007.
12. Amagoalik, John; Green, Peter; Semmler, Agnes; Patterson, Dennis; Tologanak, Kane; and 
Kadlun, Bob, «Building Nunavut,» in National and Regional Interests in the North, Canadian 
Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa 1983 pp. 141–155.
13. Saul, John Ralston, A Fair Country, Viking Canada, Toronto 2008 p. 99.
14. Dewar, Barry, «Nunavut and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement – an Unresolved 
Relationship» in Policy Options, (30) 7, 2009 pp. 74–79.
15. Cameron, Kirk; and Campbell, Alastair, «The Devolution of Natural Resources and Nunavut’s 
Constitutional Status» in Journal of Canadian Studies, (43) 2, 2009 pp. 198–219.
16. Land claims boards have received some discussion and evaluation, particularly by Graham 
White. See «Treaty Federalism in Northern Canada: Aboriginal-government land claims 
boards» in Publius: The Journal of Federalism, (32) 3, 2002 pp. 89–114; «Cultures in Collision: 
Traditional Knowledge and EuroCanadian Governance Processes in Northern Land-Claim 
Boards» in Arctic, (59) 4, 2006 pp. 401–414; and «‘Not the Almighty’: Evolving Aboriginal 
Influence in Northern Land Claim Boards» in Arctic, (61) Suppl. 1, 2008 pp. 71–85.
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sion of the processes, positions and perspectives, vis-à-vis implementation of the 
Nunavut Agreement in this paper will result in a broader appreciation by academ-
ics of the place of the Agreement and other modern treaties, in Canadian public 
policy.17
2. Historical Background
Making treaties with Indigenous peoples was, from the early seventeenth century, 
a central feature of the Crown’s approach to North America. Initial treaties, both 
written and oral, stressed peace and friendship and established military alliances 
with First Nations as the French and British fought for possession of the conti-
nent. Following the British victory in the Seven Years War (called «the French and 
Indian Wars» in the United States) King George III issued in 1763 a Proclamation 
to provide for the government of Quebec, East Florida, West Florida and Grenada, 
now within the Crown’s North American possessions. This Proclamation also re-
served unsold or unsurrendered Aboriginal lands to the exclusive use of Aboriginal 
peoples, and required formal cession to the Crown of unsurrendered Aboriginal 
lands and natural resources. Only following such cession, achieved through trea-
ties, would the Crown, in turn, issue rights to third parties allowing settlement 
and development on ceded territory. Treaty-making was continued in the Crown’s 
remaining North American possessions following the American Revolution and 
in the Dominion of Canada following confederation in 1867.18
Treaties were concluded with Aboriginal peoples in southern Canada in the 
late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries as settlement and de-
velopment moved west. The last major treaties included Treaty 11, signed in 1921 
with Dene in the Mackenzie Valley, the 1923 Williams treaties in central Ontario, 
and the 1929–1930 adhesions to Treaty 9 in northern Ontario. Most of northern 
Canada was not subject to treaty-making and it was not until a 1973 decision by 
the Supreme Court of Canada on the land rights of the Nisga’a in British Columbia, 
that the Government of Canada resumed treaty-making.19 Twenty-three compre-
17. When this paper was written, the authors were full or part-time employees of Nunavut 
Tunngavik Incorporated, the Inuit organization mandated to implement the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement. This paper reflects their personal experiences in negotiation and imple-
mentation processes.
18. Miller, James Rodger, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty Making in Canada, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2009.
19. Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313, also reproduced in Brian 
Slattery and Sheila E. Steick (eds.) Canadian Native Law Cases 7 1971–1973, pp. 17–173, 
Saskatoon 1988.
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hensive land claims agreements, or «modern» treaties, have been concluded in 
northern Canada and British Columbia in the last 35 years, five of which, including 
the Nunavut Agreement, have been negotiated and ratified by Canadian Inuit.20
3. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement
Inuit were obvious candidates to negotiate a comprehensive land claims agreement 
with the Government of Canada when, in 1973, the federal Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development announced Ottawa’s willingness to negotiate 
modern treaties with Aboriginal peoples who had not signed historic treaties, or 
whose Aboriginal title had not been superseded by law. In light of the Government 
of Quebec’s intent to develop the hydroelectric potential of the Le Grand river in 
northern Quebec, and as a result of an interlocutory injunction obtained by the 
Crees and Inuit of the region in 1973 temporarily halting the project, negotiation 
of the first modern treaty, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, pro-
ceeded rapidly and was finalized in 1975.21 Although the Government of Canada 
initiated negotiations with six northern aboriginal peoples, it was not until 1981 
that it released a formal land claims policy.22
In the absence of imminent development to spur negotiations, the Nunavut 
case was rather different from that in James Bay and Northern Quebec. Inuit in 
the Northwest Territories sought an agreement that would provide for self-deter-
mination through the creation of a Nunavut territory with its own government, 
ownership of land, and involvement in land and wildlife management to support 
their wildlife-based culture and harvesting economy. Protecting the natural envi-
ronment, including through the establishment of national parks, and promoting 
culturally and environmentally responsible economic development in which they 
would participate, were central objectives adopted in the initial Nunavut proposal, 
tabled with Prime Minister Trudeau in 1976.23 Although withdrawn for revision 
and additional community consultation, this proposal remained a statement of 
intent that influenced Inuit negotiators in subsequent years.24
20. The texts of modern treaties are available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/ldc/cci/fagr/index-
eng.asp 
21. The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1975.
22. «In All Fairness: A Native Claims Policy, Comprehensive Claims» Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development, Ottawa 1981.
23. A Proposal for the Settlement of Inuit Lands in the Northwest Territories, Inuit Tapirisat of 
Canada, Ottawa 1976.
24. Merritt, John; Fenge, Terry; Ames, Randy; and Jull, Peter, Nunavut: Political Choices and 
Manifest Destiny, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa 1989.
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Faced with the prospect of rapid exploration and potential development of hy-
drocarbons in the Beaufort Sea region, and needing quickly to define their rights 
in advance of such development, the Inuvialuit withdrew from the Nunavut pro-
ject in the mid-1970s, and negotiated a discrete land claims agreement which 
was finalized in 1984.25 The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, and the 
Inuvialuit Final Agreement, provided models and concepts for the Nunavut ne-
gotiations. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), the national Inuit organization, rep-
resented the Inuit of Nunavut in land claims negotiations with the Government 
of Canada until 1982, when the mandate to negotiate a land claims agreement in 
Nunavut was assumed by TFN. The 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
and the adoption of Home Rule in Greenland in 1979 also provided impetus to 
the Nunavut negotiations.
In addition to its constitutional nature, perhaps the most important aspect of 
the Agreement is its scope and ambition. Its 42 articles deal with economic devel-
opment, employment, environmental protection, wildlife management, social and 
cultural affairs, and ownership and management of land and natural resources, 
as well as political development. The broad intent of the Agreement is «to encour-
age self-reliance and the cultural and social well-being of Inuit,» and this intent is 
contextualized in a preambular clause that recognizes «the contribution of Inuit 
to Canada’s history, identity and sovereignty in the Arctic.»
From the very beginning of negotiations, ITC and then TFN insisted that a 
Nunavut Agreement embrace and give expression to Inuit self-determination. 
This largely explains the breadth of the Agreement and the links it forges between 
economic, social, cultural and environmental considerations in decision-making, 
and political development through the creation of a Nunavut territory with its 
own territorial government. Inuit did not attempt to inject into the Agreement the 
term «sustainable development», as popularized by the 1987 report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, but rather they negotiated from 
the premise that an Agreement should enable them to sustain their culture and 
wildlife-based economy, and bring their traditional values to bear in a modern, 
democratic state.
This intent was very much at odds with the manner in which the Government 
of Canada approached the region in the 1970s when the Nunavut project was be-
ing defined, or in the 1980s and early 1990s when it was being negotiated. During 
these years, although the federal government did support the development of rep-
25. Inuvialuit Final Agreement Between the Committee for Original People’s Entitlement and the 
Government of Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa 
1984.
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resentative and responsible government, its overall approach to the north was to 
encourage exploration and development by the mineral and energy industries 
through lenient tax and royalty regimes and other incentives, and to regulate 
these activities in reaction to the professed needs of industry, with little involve-
ment by northerners.26
In approaching land claims negotiations with the Government of Canada, Inuit 
realized that to protect their culture and economy, and the region’s fragile natural 
environment, would require a different approach to northern development. Instead 
of relying solely on a reactive and regulatory approach, Inuit sought to put in place 
a forward looking, planning approach to the use and development of land, water 
resources, marine areas, wildlife, and renewable and non-renewable natural re-
sources. Negotiators from ITC and subsequently TFN drew upon the principles of 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
From a legal perspective, the Nunavut Agreement is structured as an exchange 
between the Inuit of Nunavut and the Crown in Right of Canada. Through the 
Agreement, Inuit cede, release and surrender to the Crownall their Aboriginal 
claims, rights, title and interests, if any, in and to lands: «and waters anywhere 
within Canada and adjacent offshore areas within the sovereignty or jurisdiction 
of Canada».27
In return, Inuit receive constitutionally protected rights and benefits, including:
•	 the	right	to	harvest	wildlife	throughout	the	settlement	area	regardless	of	land	
ownership;
•	 compensation	if	development	affects	the	Inuit	harvesting	economy;
•	 representation	on	the	Nunavut	Wildlife	Management	Board,	a	new	instrument	
of public administration to manage terrestrial and marine wildlife;
•	 representation	on	new	boards	to	manage	and	plan	for	the	development	of	land	
and water and to evaluate the impact of development;
•	 establishment	of	three	national	parks	and	provisions	governing	establishment	
of additional national and territorial parks and conservation areas, and involve-
ment in managing parks and conservation areas;
•	 the	exclusive	right	to	use	water	on,	in	or	flowing	through	Inuit	owned	land;
26. Beauchamp, Kenneth, Land Management in the Canadian North, Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee, Ottawa 1976. The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry of the 1970s stands out as 
the first instance in which the voices of Aboriginal peoples were seriously considered in rela-
tion to major resource developments.
27. Article 42 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement provides that the cession and surrender 
provisions do not apply to lands and waters in Manitoba.
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•	 fee	simple	surface	title	to	approximately	356,000	km²	of	land	(15	percent	of	
Nunavut),	of	which	38,000	km²	included	subsurface	title;
•	 50 %	of	the	first	$ 2	million	and	5 %	thereafter	of	federal	royalties	from	devel-
opment of Crown-owned natural resources;
•	 the	right	to	negotiate	impact	and	benefits	agreements	with	proponents	of	major	
development projects wholly or partly under Inuit owned lands, or of water 
power generation or exploitation anywhere in Nunavut;
•	 cash	compensation	totalling	$ 1.148	billion	to	be	paid	over	14	years;
•	 establishment	of	a	Nunavut	Social	Development	Council;	and
•	 inclusion	of	Inuit	in	preserving	and	displaying	the	Inuit	archaeological	heritage.
Upon ratification of the Agreement, the Government of Canada was able to issue 
permits, leases, licenses and other rights to third parties to explore for and develop 
natural resources within the settlement area, without serious risk of litigation 
based upon continuing Aboriginal title. In this fashion the Agreement provided 
a favourable legal climate for economic development, with the potential to expand 
the taxation, rent and royalty revenues that accrue to Ottawa.28
Inuit make up 85 percent of the population of the territory, but the Government 
of Nunavut is a public government that serves all residents of Nunavut regardless of 
ethnicity, reflecting a Nunavut-wide rather than an Inuit-only franchise. Upon its 
establishment in 1999 the jurisdiction of the Government of Nunavut was similar 
to that of Yukon and the Northwest Territories. Unlike Canadian provinces, the 
vast majority of Crown land and natural resources in the territories is owned by 
the federal Crown. In principle, the federal government is committed to transfer 
most Crown lands and resources to the territorial governments, and has completed 
this devolution process in Yukon. With Nunavut, however, formal negotiations on 
this subject have yet to begin.29
28. NTI has argued that the cede, release and surrender provisions of the Nunavut Agreement 
may not provide «final and complete» legal certainty: «the provision is part of a contract be-
tween Inuit and the Crown, thereby raising questions about what might happen in the event 
of circumstances amounting to fundamental breach of the contract by the Crown or to frus-
tration of the contract,» in «A Submission to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,» 
Nunavut Tunngavik, 1993, p. 5.
29. The Government of Canada, the Government of Nunavut and NTI signed a «Lands and 
Resources Devolution Negotiations Protocol» on September 8, 2008. Available at http://www.
ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/ldc/ccl/fagr/nuna/nti/nti-eng.asp
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4. Implementing the Nunavut Agreement: First Steps
The 1986 federal policy under which the Nunavut Agreement was negotiated in-
cludes only one sentence on implementation – a requirement that implementation 
plans be in place when modern treaties are ratified.30 In the Nunavut case, a 10-year 
plan with formal contractual status, but not protected under Canada’s constitu-
tion, was negotiated following conclusion of the April 1990 Nunavut Agreement-
in-Principle, and signed by the governments of Canada and the Northwest 
Territories, and TFN in 1993.31 Importantly, the Government of the Northwest 
Territories and after 1999 the Government of Nunavut, were full parties to the 
Nunavut Implementation Contract. Later in 1993 the governments of Canada 
and the Northwest Territories signed a bilateral funding agreement,32 reflecting a 
Memorandum of Understanding they had concluded in 1992,33 to enable the terri-
torial government to fulfill its responsibilities under the implementation contract.
A weighty document in its own right – more than 200 pages – the Implementation 
Contract identified obligations in the Agreement and specified agencies of the 
Government of Canada to fulfill those obligations. It also laid out budgets for 
resource management boards, called Institutions of Public Government (IPGs), 
established pursuant to the Agreement and upon which Inuit are represented, 
to plan for and manage the use of wildlife, land, freshwater, marine areas and to 
evaluate the impacts of proposed development, and terms of reference for transi-
tion teams to set-up these IPGs.34
The implementation provisions of the Agreement establish a four-person 
Nunavut Implementation Panel (NIP), composed of representatives of the federal 
and territorial governments and NTI to «oversee and provide direction on the 
30. Comprehensive Land Claims Policy, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa 1987.
31. A Contract Relating to the Implementation of the Nunavut Final Agreement, Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa 1993, available at www.tunngavik.com/documents/
publications/1993–00–00-Implementation-Contract-of-the-Nunavut-Land-Claims-Agree-
ment-English.pdf
32. «Bilateral Funding Agreement Respecting the Implementation of the Nunavut Final 
Agreement between the Government of Canada (Canada) and the Government of the 
Northwest Territories (GNWT)» Ottawa, November 19, 1993.
33. «Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the Northwest Territories on Comprehensive Land Claim Implementation» Ottawa, July 
7, 1992.
34. Total funding for the five Institutions of Public Government established pursuant to the 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement – Nunavut Wildlife Management Board, Nunavut Water 
Board, Nunavut Impact Review Board, Nunavut Planning Commission, and a Surface Rights 
Tribunal	–	in	year	one	of	the	10-year	implementation	contract	was	$4,394,926	CAD,	rising	to	
$9,961,814	CAD	in	years	three	to	seven,	and	ending	in	$8,961,814	in	years	nine	and	ten.
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implementation of the Agreement.» The panel is required to organize independ-
ent reviews of implementation every five years. NTI’s brief to the consultants who 
conducted the review of implementation from 1993 to 1998 stressed problems with 
implementing government contracting provisions, the quota of turbot (Greenland 
halibut) allocated by the Government of Canada to Nunavut fishers, the lack of 
progress in hiring Inuit by the territorial and federal governments, and delays 
by the Government of Canada in introducing proposed legislation dealing with 
management of land, water, and renewable resources.35
Published in 2000, the review concluded that of 193 specific obligations, 98 
were «substantially complete,» 46 were «partially complete,» and 49 were «largely 
unmet.» These bald figures tell only part of the story. Relatively simple, discrete 
tasks such as transfer of cash and land to Inuit had been carried out on time, but 
the review identified significant problems in the implementation of more complex 
obligations that require innovative, co-ordinated action on the part of federal agen-
cies. The review team reported «a pattern of missed deadlines, and slow starts, a 
lot of unproductive and extended discussions, backsliding on obligations, loss of 
corporate memory and capacity, and the consumption of resources without a full 
result.»36
The review recommended that the NIP be reinvigorated, and it urged the parties 
to agree on the panel’s «central role in managing the implementation effort.» While 
many problems were identified, this was perhaps a mildly encouraging beginning.
A second independent review dealing with implementation from January 1999 
to July 2005 reported a number of accomplishments, including «inclusive drafting» 
of legislation to implement the wildlife provisions, and the conclusion of impact 
and benefit agreements for national parks and Nunavut’s first diamond mine. The 
review also commented that the Government of Canada was not fully meeting 
its obligations under Article 24 regarding government contracting, and raised 
major questions about the ineffective resolution of disputes between the parties.37 
Covering the start-up period of the Government of Nunavut, the review identified 
35. «Taking Stock: A Review of the First Five Years of Implementing the Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement,» Iqaluit, Nunavut; Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, Iqaluit 1999. Available at 
www.tunngavik.com/category/publications/implementation/
36. Vertes, Louise; Connelly, David; and Knott, Bruce, Implementation of the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement: an Independent 5-Year Review, 1993 to 1998 Innirvik Support Services 
Ltd. Iqaluit, Nunavut 2000, pp. 4–5. Available at www.tunngavik.com/category/publications/
implementation/
37. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, «Second Independent Five Year Review of Implementation of the 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement,» Ottawa May 2006. Available at www.tunngavik.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/second-five-year-review-of-the-nunavut-land-claims-agreement.pdf
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several barriers to effective implementation, including differences in interpretation 
of obligations, disputes over funding, a lack of collaboration, and the absence of a 
process to monitor implementation.
This review again recommended reinvigorating the NIP and urged the parties 
to develop collaborative processes enabling resolution of disputes.
5. Renewing the Implementation Contract
Negotiations commenced in 2001 to renew the implementation contract for the 
period 2003 to 2013, but the Government of Canada, the Government of Nunavut, 
and NTI were unable to come to an agreement. The Government of Canada 
seemed committed to the 1992 Land Claims Implementation MOU and 1993 
Bilateral Funding Agreement as the basis to calculate funds to renew the Nunavut 
Implementation Contract. This would essentially repeat the budgets in the first 
implementation contract, but with an inflation adjustment. The Government of 
Canada was not persuaded by NTI or the Government of Nunavut that these as-
sumptions should be revisited, based on actual implementation experience. As a 
result of its weak tax base and heavy reliance on funds transferred from Ottawa to 
pay for services to its citizens, the Government of Nunavut wanted to ensure that 
the renewed implementation contract would identify and fully cover its incremen-
tal costs in carrying out its responsibilities under the Agreement.
The	1993–2003	Implementation	Contract	had	identified	$ 1.47	million	in	year	
one,	decreasing	to	$ 728,000	in	year	ten,	to	cover	the	territorial	government’s	in-
cremental costs. In 2002 the Government of Nunavut tabled a position seeking 
more	than	$ 200	million	to	cover	its	incremental	costs	for	the	2003–2013	period.	
Clearly the parties were very far apart, not just on budgets, but on what constituted 
an incremental cost.
NTI’s position that the contract be renewed to reflect the conclusions and 
recom mendations of the first five-year implementation review was not accepted 
by the Government of Canada, which also argued for removal of the contractual 
status of the implementation plan. NTI interpreted this position as a weakening 
of resolve on the part of the Government of Canada to fulfill its obligations. NTI 
rejected this position and criticized the mandate of the Government of Canada’s 
implementation negotiator who suggested in turn that NTI was inappropriately 
seeking to enrich the Agreement through implementation negotiations.
Tensions developed during these negotiations were played out in meetings of 
the NIP, which became increasingly unproductive as a result. The Government 
of Canada’s blanket refusal to refer any disputes to arbitration as provided for in 
alastair campbell, terry fenge and udloriak hanson
38
Article 38 of the Agreement, came to epitomize the impasse.38 The Government of 
Canada suggested that arbitration of disputes involving financial matters would 
detract from Parliament’s exclusive role in appropriating money.39 In light of 
Parliament’s legislative ratification of the Agreement in 1993, including its arbi-
tration provisions, and the constitutional nature of the rights defined, NTI strongly 
objected to this position.
Lack of progress in hiring Inuit in government was also a difficult and politically 
contentious issue. While not specifying a target date, Article 23 of the Agreement 
aimed for a «representative» civil service which would require approximately 85 
percent of the positions within all occupational groupings to be held by Inuit. 
By 2003 less than 50 percent of the workforce of the Government of Nunavut 
was Inuit, and federal agencies operating in the territory were below 40 percent. 
Moreover most Inuit employed in government were in secretarial and administra-
tive support, non-professional categories, although some held senior management 
positions. Research conducted for NTI and the Government of Nunavut by the 
consulting firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers estimated that Inuit were losing approxi-
mately	$ 123	million	dollars	annually	in	wages	and	salaries,	and	that	additional	
millions were being spent by the federal and territorial governments to relocate 
personnel hired from the south to carry out administrative duties in Nunavut.40
Significant funding to train Inuit to qualify and assume positions in govern-
ment would be required if the objective in the Agreement of a representative civil 
service were ever to be reached. Related to the attainment of this objective, the 
Government	of	Nunavut	had	requested	nearly	$ 60	million	for	the	2003–2013	im-
plementation period to promote use of Inuktitut, but the Government of Canada 
was not prepared to provide funding for this purpose.
With implementation contract negotiations at a standstill, the federal and ter-
ritorial governments and NTI agreed that Thomas Berger, a former Justice of the 
British Columbia Supreme Court and former Commissioner of the Mackenzie 
Valley Pipeline Inquiry, be appointed as a conciliator. His August 2005 Interim 
38. Article 38.2.1. (a) of the Nunavut Agreement requires the parties to agree to refer a dispute to 
arbitration. The Inuvialuit Agreement enables either party to refer a dispute to arbitration.
39. The Government of Canada conveyed its position on arbitration to the NIP in a February 21, 
2003 memo. For commentary on this position see, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to 
the House of Commons, November 2003, Minister of Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, Ottawa, chapter 8; and Berger, Thomas, «Conciliator’s Interim Report: Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement Implementation Contract Negotiations for the Second Planning Period,» 
Vancouver August 31 2005, p. 37.
40. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, «The Cost of Not Successfully Implementing Article 23,» Ottawa 
February 2003, p.9. Available at www.tunngavik.com/category/publications/implementation/
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Report dealt in part with funding of the Institutions of Public Government (IPGs), 
and enabled the parties to agree to relatively modest increases in the IPGs’ budgets 
for the remainder of the 2003–2013 period.41 His eloquent but hard-hitting Final 
Report, in which he said that Nunavut «faces a moment of change, a moment of 
crisis,» was presented in March 2006.42
Focusing on the underlying context rather than week-by-week challenges of 
implementation, Berger concentrated on the need to significantly improve the 
education system in Nunavut to educate and train Inuit to take up employment 
in Nunavut. He noted:
The language spoken by Inuit is Inuktitut. Indeed for 75 percent of the Inuit, Inuktitut 
is still the first language spoken in the home, and fully 15 percent of Inuit (mostly 
living in the smaller communities) have no other language. Given the demographics 
of the new territory Inuktitut ought, generally speaking, to be the language of the 
governmental workplace in Nunavut and the language of the delivery of government 
services. But it is not. The principal language of government in Nunavut is English. 
So the people of the new territory speak a language which is an impediment to ob-
taining employment in their own public service.43
The key to success, he suggested, was to ensure that Inuit were functionally liter-
ate in Inuktitut and English. Therefore «we must undertake nothing less than a 
new program of bilingual education – starting in the pre-school years, and from 
kindergarten through Grade 12.»44
NTI welcomed Berger’s Final Report and urged the Conservative Government 
of Canada, which in the federal election of January 2006 replaced its Liberal pre-
decessor, to endorse it.45 But Berger apparently was never asked by the Minister 
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to explain his report, and there has 
been no formal response to it by the Government of Canada.
41. Thomas R. Berger, «Conciliator’s Interim Report: Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
Implementation, Contract Negotiations for the Second Planning Period,» August 31, 2005. 
Available at www.tunngavik.com/category/publications/implementation/
42. Thomas R. Berger, «Conciliator’s Final Report: Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
Implementation, Contract Negotiations for the Second Planning Period»(March 1, 2006). 
Available at www.tunngavik.com/category/publications/implementation/
43. Ibid p. iii.
44. Ibid p. vi.
45. «Berger calls for Bilingual Education System in Nunavut,» press release issued by Nunavut 
Tunngavik Incorporated, April 5, 2006. Available at www.tunngavik.com/2006/04/05/berger-
calls-for-bilingual-education-system-in-nunavut/
alastair campbell, terry fenge and udloriak hanson
40
6. Persuading the Government of Canada to 
Implement the Nunavut Agreement
6.1 The Auditor General of Canada
As part of her ongoing responsibilities, the Auditor General of Canada in 2003 
released an audit of the transfer of federal responsibilities to the North by the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). The audit 
examined implementation of the Nunavut Agreement and the 1992 Gwich’in 
Agreement in the Northwest Territories.46 The audit concluded:
INAC seems focused on fulfilling the letter of the land claims’ implementation plans 
but not the spirit. Officials may believe that they have met their obligations, but in 
fact they have not worked to support the full intent of the land claims agreements.47
… the various mechanisms for managing the claims are not effective in resolv-
ing all disputes. Land claims arbitration panels have not dealt with any of the long-
standing disagreements since the claims were settled over 10 years ago.48
Once land claims agreements are signed, managing them well means focusing on 
not only meeting the specific obligations of the claims but also achieving measurable 
results against the objectives.49
The audit noted that DIAND «fundamentally disagreed» with the Auditor 
General’s view on how success for implementing land claims agreements should 
be measured. DIAND, she reported, defines success as fulfilling specific obliga-
tions set out in agreements and implementation plans.
In 2007 the Auditor General also audited implementation of the 1984 Inuvialuit 
Final Agreement which covers the Beaufort Sea region. In expressing strong 
support for her findings, and recalling her 2003 report, the Inuvialuit Regional 
Corporation remarked that: 
… the federal government continues to focus narrowly on the letter of its obligations 
under land claim agreements while refusing to accept any responsibility to work with 
46. Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons: 
Chapter 8 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada – Transferring Federal Responsibilities to the 
North, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, Ottawa 2003.
47. Ibid. p. 1.
48. Ibid. For an examination of the dispute resolution provisions of three northern land claims 
agreements, including the Nunavut Agreement, see Bankes, Nigel, «The Dispute Resolution 
Provisions of Three Northern Land Claims Agreements» in Intercultural Dispute Resolution 
in Aboriginal Contexts, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver 2004 pp. 299–328.
49. Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons: 
Chapter 8 Indian Affairs and Northern Affairs Canada – Transferring Federal Responsibilities 
to the North, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, Ottawa 2003 p. 1.
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the respective claimant groups in identifying measures that would support achieve-
ment of the spirit and intent and overall goals of the agreements.50
In light of the Auditor General’s 2003 report, and in recognition of the media 
and political attention such reviews invariably generate, in 2004 NTI petitioned 
the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, a compo-
nent of the Office of the Auditor General, concerning implementation failures by 
DIAND.51 Specifically NTI alleged that DIAND was failing in its responsibility 
to ensure development was environmentally sustainable by neglecting to moni-
tor the ecosystemic and socio-economic environment of Nunavut, as required in 
Article 12 of the Agreement, which reads: «Government, in co-operation with 
the Nunavut Planning Commission, shall be responsible for developing a general 
monitoring plan and for co-ordinating general monitoring and data collection.»
The response of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to the 
petition did not dispute the fact that a general monitoring plan had yet to be devel-
oped, more than a decade after the Agreement was ratified. Instead the Minister 
listed ongoing research and administrative activities by federal agencies to protect 
the northern environment, promised consultations and workshops, and suggested 
that the Nunavut Planning Commission, rather than the federal and territorial 
governments, was responsible for implementing the general monitoring plan.52
6.2 The Land Claims Agreements Coalition
In 1985 Aboriginal peoples negotiating modern treaties with the Crown formed 
a coalition to press for changes to the policy under which the Government of 
Canada entered into negotiations.53 The resulting 1987 Comprehensive Land 
Claims Policy54 broadened the rights and benefits that could be included in mod-
ern treaties, for example, by allowing Aboriginal signatories to negotiate a share 
of royalties accruing to the Government of Canada as a result of development of 
federal Crown land. These policy changes owed much to the effective lobbying of 
the coalition. Fifteen years later it was clear to Aboriginal peoples who had rati-
50. «Report of the Auditor General of Canada: Chapter 3, Inuvialuit Final Agreement,» Press 
Release issued by the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, October 31, 2007. Available at www.
irc.inuvialuit.com
51. The petition is available at www.tunngavik.com/category/publications/implementation/
52. Hon. Andy Scott, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, in a letter to Richard 
Paton, Chief Operating Officer, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, February 9, 2005. 
53. Fenge, Terry; and Barnaby, Joanne; «From Recommendations to Policy: Battling Inertia to 
Obtain a Land Claims Policy» in Northern Perspectives, (15) 1, 1987 pp. 12–15.
54. «Comprehensive Land Claims Policy» Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1987.
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fied modern treaties that many implementation problems were systemic in nature, 
rather than the result of local or regional circumstances, and that collective ac-
tion on their part was needed to persuade the Government of Canada to fulfill its 
responsibilities.
In November 2003 those Aboriginal peoples with modern treaties convened in 
Ottawa a national conference entitled «Redefining Relationships.»55 An extraor-
dinarily successful event with approximately 350 participants, including observ-
ers from a number of countries, the conference gave birth to a new coalition, the 
Land Claims Agreements Coalition, with a mandate to press the Government of 
Canada to live up to its obligations and fully implement modern treaties. NTI and 
the Nisga’a Nation of British Columbia were chosen to jointly chair the Coalition.
At its founding conference the Coalition released a discussion paper inviting 
the Government of Canada to commit to an implementation policy founded on 
four principles:
1.  Recognition that the Crown in Right of Canada, not the Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, is party to our land claims agreements and 
self-government agreements;
2. There must be a federal commitment to achieve the broad objectives of the land 
claims agreements and self government agreements within the context of the 
new relationships, as opposed to mere technical compliance with narrowly-
defined obligations. This must include, but not be limited to, ensuring adequate 
funding to achieve these objectives and obligations.
3. Implementation must be handled by appropriate level federal officials represent-
ing the entire Canadian government; and
4. There must be an independent implementation audit and review body, sepa-
rate from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. This 
could be the Office of the Auditor General or another office reporting directly 
to Parliament. Annual reports would be prepared by this office in consultation 
with groups with land claims agreements.56
The Coalition held additional national conferences in 2006 and 2009. Systemic 
problems bedevilling implementation were seen by Coalition members as largely 
Ottawa-based, and it was for this reason that a formal Cabinet-approved imple-
mentation policy was thought necessary and became the Coalition’s key recom-
mendation.
55. Redefining Relationships: Learning from a Decade of Land Claims Implementation November 
11–14 2003, Ottawa. Available at www.consilium.ca
56. www.landclaimscoalition.ca/pdf/LCAC/ Discussion_paper_040416.pdf
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In 2004 and accelerating in 2005, a small team of technical and legal representa-
tives of Coalition members met regularly with civil servants from various federal 
agencies, chaired by the Aboriginal Secretariat of the Privy Council Office (PCO) 
which served the Cabinet Committee on Aboriginal Peoples. By late autumn 2005, 
these meetings had generated a preliminary draft implementation policy.
As mentioned earlier, the federal election of January 2006 resulted in a minor-
ity Conservative government. The Cabinet Committee on Aboriginal Peoples and 
the branch of the Privy Council Office Secretariat that served it were disbanded, 
and the new Government of Canada refused to negotiate with, or even to meet, 
representatives of the Coalition. Instead the Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development was directed to consult on a regional basis with Aboriginal 
peoples regarding implementation difficulties. Coalition members rearticulated 
the analyses and position of the Coalition at these regional consultations. Rather 
than supplanting the Coalition and diverting its advocacy, DIAND’s consultation 
exercise reinforced the conviction that implementation problems should be ad-
dressed in a comprehensive, policy-driven manner if modern treaties were to be 
fully implemented.
The Coalition continued to recommend to the Government of Canada the im-
portance of implementing modern treaties as a means of improving the circum-
stances of many Indigenous peoples. In December 2006 the Coalition adopted a 
ten-point «Declaration of Dedication and Commitment,» which elaborated on 
the four principles contained in the Coalition’s 2003 discussion paper, and which 
stressed the need for the full implementation of modern treaties as a means of 
upholding the «honour of the Crown» in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples. 
The Declaration further characterized Aboriginal and treaty rights as the most 
pressing human rights issue facing Canadians.57
Having stressed the link between Aboriginal, treaty and human rights, in 
September 2008 the Coalition submitted an extensive brief to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council requesting it to conclude and recommend:
that the fulfillment of the broad socio-economic objectives of modern land claims 
agreements entered into with Indigenous peoples in Canada, and associated self-
government agreements, must be undertaken not only because it is the obligation of 
the Government of Canada, but because it is in Canada’s national and international 
interest to do so.58
57. www.landclaimscoalition.ca/pdf/10_Points_Document_060925.pdf
58.	 This	 brief	 is	 available	 at	 www.landclaimscoalition.ca/pdf/080908%20CANADA%20
-%LCAC20Submission	
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6.3 The Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples
As a result of the activities of the Coalition, including commentaries by Coalition 
members in Canadian newspapers,59 the Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 
embarked in 2007 on a study of implementation of modern treaties, including 
public hearings in Ottawa. Coalition members presented well-articulated and 
well-received briefs.
While many federal agencies presented testimony, the study was not uniform-
ly welcomed. The Privy Council Office for example, did not appear before the 
Committee, although requested to do so. Nevertheless the hearings generated 
considerable information, much of which supported the Coalition’s position. For 
example, the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development stated 
to the Committee that his department could not «compel» other departments of 
the Government of Canada to live up to duties and obligations, notwithstanding 
the constitutional nature of modern treaties.60 The Coalition felt that presentations 
by the Treasury Board Secretariat and DIAND revealed a lack of co-ordination 
within the Government of Canada in efforts to address the costs of implementing 
modern treaties.
The Spring 2008 report of the Senate Committee entitled «Honouring the Spirit 
of Modern Treaties: Closing the Loopholes» strongly supported the Coalition’s 
views and recommendations: 
… the committee is troubled by the narrow approach to treaty implementation 
adopted by the federal government. Federal practices and policy in this regard have 
resulted in the diminishment of the benefits and rights promised to Aboriginal 
peoples under these agreements … We believe much of the failure rests with the 
institutional role and mandate of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development … Failure to properly implement the provisions of modern treaties 
puts Canada at risk for generating new legions of broken promises. However, we are 
convinced that these challenges can be overcome. The honour of the Crown rests 
upon it.61
59. «It’s the aboriginal peoples’ turn,» The Globe and Mail, April 28 2005 p. A15.
60. Proceedings of the Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, Issue No. 3, Evidence, February 
12, 2008.
61. Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, «Honouring the Spirit of Modern 
Treaties: Closing the Loopholes» Interim Report: Special Study on the Implementation of 
Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements in Canada, Ottawa May, 2008. This report, and 
the response to it by the Government of Canada, is available at www.parl/gc.ca/39/2/parlbus/
commbus/senate/
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From this unyielding interpretation of the nature of the problem, the Committee 
made the following sweeping recommendations to the Government of Canada:
•	 That	it	abandon	its	practice	of	systematically	refusing	to	consent	to	arbitration;
•	 That,	in	collaboration	with	the	Land	Claims	Agreements	Coalition,	it	take	im-
mediate steps to develop a new national land claims implementation policy, 
based on principles endorsed by members of the Land Claims Agreements 
Coalition;
•	 That	in	collaboration	with	the	Land	Claims	Agreements	Coalition,	it	take	im-
mediate steps to establish an independent body, through legislation, such as a 
Modern Treaty Commission to oversee the implementation of comprehensive 
land claims agreements, including financial matters;
•	 That	the	Clerk	of	the	Privy	Council	take	immediate	steps	to	establish	a	senior	
level working group to revisit the authorities, roles responsibilities and capaci-
ties respecting the coordination of federal obligations under comprehensive 
land claims agreements, with a view to establishing clear guidelines, and that 
the Clerk of the Privy Council Office table these guidelines with the Senate 
Committee by March 31, 2009; and
•	 That	the	periodic	negotiation	of	implementation	funding	for	Canada’s	obliga-
tions under modern land claims agreements be led by a Chief Negotiator, ap-
pointed jointly by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
and the Land Claims Agreements Coalition, reporting directly to the Minister 
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.62
The Government of Canada did not provide a formal response to the committee’s 
report until a year later, in a two-and-a-half page letter from the Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development. This response stressed the intent to develop 
«guidelines» for implementing agreements, including the use of arbitration for 
matters having financial implications. The Coalition felt that the Minister was 
launching an administrative response to a political and policy problem, and that 
this approach would not change matters substantively.
In February 2009, DIAND released an evaluation it had prepared of the impacts of 
four comprehensive land claims agreements: the Northeastern Quebec Agreement 
with the Naskapi, the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, the Gwich’in Comprehensive 
Land Claims Agreement, and the Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land 
Claims Agreement. While generally positive about implementation of these agree-
62. Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, «Honouring the Spirit of Modern 
Treaties: Closing the Loopholes» Interim Report: Special Study on the Implementation of 
Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements in Canada, Ottawa May, 2008 pp. ix – xi. Available 
at www.parl/gc.ca/39/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/
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ments and characterizing the concerns of the Coalition as perceptual rather than 
substantive or proven, the evaluation nevertheless recommended that DIAND:
Consider leading the establishment of a policy for the implementation of compre-
hensive land claims which would clarify roles and responsibilities and the federal 
approach to implementing Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements.63
Committed to following-up the report of the Senate Committee and to build on 
the momentum it had generated, the Coalition prepared a «model modern treaty 
implementation policy,» which it released in March 2009.64 This 12-page docu-
ment built upon the Coalition’s 2003 discussion paper and reflected perspectives 
generated at the Coalition’s national conferences. One week before its release, the 
Coalition met the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and pro-
vided him with the model policy, which he promised to review, and to provide a 
«considered response.» This has been the only meeting between the Coalition and a 
federal minister since the Coalition was formed in 2003. As of December 2010, the 
Government of Canada had not responded to the model implementation policy, 
nor have the promised implementation «guidelines» been produced.
In April 2010 the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
released to the Coalition an Implementation Management Framework, providing 
for the establishment of interdepartmental committees to focus on implementa-
tion of modern treaties.65 Although a useful administrative measure, this falls far 
short of the overhaul of federal implementation policy and practice sought by the 
Coalition.
6.4 NTI Goes to Court
In December 2006, NTI launched a lawsuit in the Nunavut Court of Justice against 
the Government of Canada for breach of contract regarding implementation of 
the	Nunavut	Agreement,	and	seeking	damages	of	$ 1	billion.	The	failure	of	nego-
tiations to renew the implementation contract and the effective rejection by the 
63. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, «Impact Evaluation of 
Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements,» Ottawa February 17, 2009. Available at http://
www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ai/arp/aev/pubs/ev/clca/clca-eng.asp
64. www.landclaimscoalition.ca/pdf/C_LCAC_410.pdf
65. Michael Wernick, Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in a letter 
to Mitchell Stevens, President, Nisga’a Lisims Government, and Paul Kaludjak, President, 
Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, April 16, 2010. The Implementation Management 
Framework is not posted on the web site of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development.
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Government of Canada of the 2006 final report by conciliator Tom Berger, were 
important ingredients in persuading NTI to take this unusual step.66
The most important aspect of NTI’s Statement of Claim is its scope and 
breadth.67 NTI alleges the agreement has been breached contractually in the fol-
lowing 16 respects: 
•	 proper	and	adequate	funding	has	not	been	provided	to	the	IPGs;
•	 adequate	funding	has	not	been	provided	to	Hunters	and	Trappers	Organizations;
•	 a	general	monitoring	plan	has	not	been	developed;
•	 initiatives	to	increase	Inuit	participation	in	government	have	not	been	taken;
•	 there	has	been	no	co-operation	in	the	development	and	implementation	of	
adequate employment and training initiatives;
•	 an	Inuit	labour	force	analysis	has	not	been	carried	out;
•	 Inuit	employment	plans,	to	get	Inuit	employment	in	government	at	a	repre-
sentative level, have not been carried out;
•	 specific	measures	required	under	Inuit	Employment	Plans	have	not	been	un-
dertaken;
•	 a	second	five-year	review	of	Inuit	employment	plans	has	not	been	carried	out;
•	 procurement	policies	have	not	been	established	or	maintained;
•	 evaluation	and	monitoring	of	government	contracts	has	not	been	carried	out;
•	 funding	levels	allocated	to	implement	the	Agreement,	as	required	in	the	im-
plementation plan, have never been identified;
•	 Inuit	Impact	and	Benefit	Agreements	have	not	been	entered	into;
•	 funding	for	Inuit	Impact	and	Benefit	Agreements	has	been	withheld;
•	 funding	for	implementation	after	the	initial	10-year	period	has	not	been	agreed	
to; and
•	 consent	to	use	the	arbitration	process	has	been	unreasonably	withheld.
When announcing the suit the President of NTI, Paul Kaludjak, said:
The Government of Canada keeps Inuit dependent and in a state of financial and 
emotional despair despite promises made when the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
was signed in 1993. The Government of Canada is not holding up its end of the bar-
66. «NTI Launches Lawsuit Against Government of Canada for Breach of Contract,» press release 
issued by Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, December 6, 2006. Available at www.tunnga-
vik.com/2006/12/06/nti_launches_lawsuit_against_government_of_canada-for-breach-of-
contract/
67. The «Statement of Claim» by Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, the Government of Canada’s 
«Statement of Defence,» and the «Reply and Joinder of Issue» by Nunavut Tunngavik 
Incorporated are available at www.tunngavik.com/categories/publications/legal
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gain. Canada got what it wanted immediately upon signing … Inuit are still waiting 
for full implementation of the Agreement.
What is at stake here is whether the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement will con-
tinue to be a central factor in shaping the future of Nunavut and improving the lives 
of Inuit. We will do everything in our power to ensure the [agreement] benefits Inuit 
in the ways it was intended to.68
At the time of writing, December 2010, NTI’s lawsuit was proceeding through 
discovery hearings.
7. Concluding Thoughts and into the Future
Inuit approached negotiation of the Nunavut Agreement as their best opportu-
nity to gain control over their own affairs and to design and create a path into an 
uncertain and rapidly-changing future. They were looking for an Agreement that 
would help them adapt to the wider world, yet also help them to alter the politi-
cal and economic contexts in which they were adapting. This intent explains why 
the Agreement is structured around a partnership between Inuit and the govern-
ments of Canada and Nunavut. This paper suggests that this partnership is not 
in good shape and that, as a result, the Agreement is not delivering what it could 
and should.
When appearing before the Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples as a mem-
ber of the Land Claims Agreements Coalition, the legal counsel to the Nisga’a 
Nation suggested that the Government of Canada treats modern treaties like di-
vorce settlements or separation agreements, rather than marriage partnerships.69 
There is considerable evidence in the Nunavut experience to support this char-
acterization.
That modern treaties could be used to achieve environmental, social, economic 
and cultural public policy objectives seems little understood by federal representa-
tives, or if understood, does not seem to inform their approach toward implemen-
tation. Indeed it appears that instead of asking how to best use these agreements for 
broad public purposes, the operative question in Ottawa is how to satisfy minimal 
legal requirements to avoid litigation. In light of NTI’s lawsuit, the Nunavut ex-
perience suggests that Ottawa is failing in answering even this question correctly.
68. «NTI Launches Lawsuit Against the Government of Canada for Breach of Contract,» press 
release issued by Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, December 6, 2006. Available at www.
tunngavik.com/2006/12/06/
69. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, Issue No. 2, Evidence, 
December 4, 2007.
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Modern treaties are between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown, not the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development – a «line department» 
with little authority in relation to, or leverage over, other government departments. 
The Nunavut Agreement impinges on the mandates and programmes of many 
federal departments, yet by and large these same departments are often ignorant 
of their obligations under the Agreement, and seem to prefer having government-
wide obligations treated as the responsibility of DIAND.70 To fully implement the 
Nunavut Agreement, and all modern treaties, requires departments and agencies 
of the Government of Canada to operate as a co-ordinated whole, rather than a 
set of disparate parts.
The Nunavut experience is not unique, and this is why the Coalition advocates 
political, institutional, policy and administrative solutions to ensure full imple-
mentation of modern treaties. The Government of Canada has yet to endorse the 
Coalition’s analysis and remedies. While the recently-announced Implementation 
Management Framework, mentioned earlier, is likely a step in the right direction, 
it is insufficient to address implementation inadequacies identified by the members 
of the Land Claims Agreements Coalition. Problems and challenges outlined in 
this paper in implementing the Nunavut Agreement, and in implementing modern 
treaties elsewhere in Canada, are likely to continue. All those with an interest in 
implementing the Nunavut Agreement could usefully ponder the advice offered 
by Thomas R. Berger in his Conciliator’s reports:
In the end, successful implementation depends far more on the goodwill of the par-
ties and the honour of the Crown than any formal requirements derived from the 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, or the implementation Contract … I think it is 
a mistake to speak solely of enforcing legal obligations, or for that matter designing 
new ones. Under the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement the parties should adopt a 
broader approach.
70. The Land Claims Agreements Coalition concludes that this is a problem with implemen-
tation of all modern treaties. The issue is addressed in Proceedings of the Standing Senate 
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, Issue No. 3, Evidence, February 12, 2008 pp. 20–24. See 
also Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of 
Commons: Chapter 3, Inuvialuit Final Agreement, Minister of Public Works and Government 
Services Canada, Ottawa 2007 pp.12–16. In considering an alleged breach of the Inuvialuit 
Final Agreement regarding the clean-up of Distant Early Warning-Line sites, the arbitration 
panel established under the Agreement found that clean-up obligations in the Agreement 
bound all departments of government. The Panel noted that the practices and procedures of 
the Department of Supply and Services needed to be revised to take account of the require-
ments of the Agreement, and further urged the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development to inform and educate other government departments about the Agreement. 
Bankes, op. cit. pp. 314–316.
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It is an approach found in the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement itself. Article 37 
of the Agreement describes a number of principles underlying its implementation. 
Prominent among them are Articles 37.1.1. (a) and (b) which provide that the im-
plementation planning process «shall mirror the spirit and intent of the Agreement 
and its various terms and conditions» and, moreover, that «implementation shall 
reflect the objectives of the Agreement of encouraging self-reliance and the cultural 
and social well-being of Inuit.» These are not narrowly technical requirements. 
As I read them, they describe an Agreement by the parties to employ a purposive 
approach to implementation.
The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement is a constitutional instrument. Although, 
like most constitutional instruments, it contains very specific provisions, its central 
purpose is to describe an idea. Its framers were drafting a document to establish 
a new relationship between Canada and the Inuit of Nunavut that would last for 
generations; they were not simply setting out performance requirements in a con-
tract. A new approach requires that the parties be as constructive and creative in its 
implementation as the visionary men and women on both sides of the negotiating 
table who drafted the Agreement.71
Реализация Соглашения по земельным претензиям от 1993 года в Нунавуте
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com), BSc. (Wales) MA (Victoria), PhD (Waterloo), и Удлориак Хансон BBA 
(Okanagan University College) BEd (Brock), работали в Nunavut Tunngavik 
Incorporated в то время, когда писали эту статью. Статья отражает их лич-
ный опыт участия в переговорах и реализации Соглашения по земельным 
претензиям в Нунавуте.
Краткое содержание
Спустя более 20 лет исследований и переговоров, в 1991 году инуитами и в 
1993 году Парламентом Канады было ратифицировано Соглашение по зе-
мельным претензиям Нунавут (NLCA). В соответствии с Соглашением, в 
1999 году были созданы Территория Нунавут с правительством Нунавут. В 
обмен на широкий круг конституционно защищаемых прав и преимуществ, 
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инуиты Нунавута уступили Короне «все свои аборигенные претензии и пра-
ва, права собственности и интересы … на земли и воду в территориальных 
пределах Канады …» Хотя многое было достигнуто в результате подписания 
Соглашения, до сих пор остаются огромные проблемы в области его реали-
зации. Успех его реализации требует прочных и устойчивых основ в пар-
тнерстве между инуитами Нунавута и правительствами Канады и провинции 
Нунавут. Для того, чтобы это партнерство стало эффективным и защищало 
«честь короны», правительство Канады должно принять политику и межве-
домственных и межправительственных процессов для обеспечения Соглаше-
ния в полном объеме.
Ключевые слова инуиты, Соглашение в Нунавуте, реализация, правитель-
ство Канады, судебное разбирательство.
